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Regulatory Ambiguity and Corruption
Leonard F. Herk
"The one great principle of the English law is, to make business
for itself." -- Charles Dickens, Bleak House (1853)
I. Introduction
Corruption is generally interpreted among economists to mean the illicit
buying or selling of public property for private gain (Cadot, 1993; Shleifer
and Vishny, 1993). However, a broader definition of corruption might also
encompass the licit behavior of public agencies possessing broad yet
ambiguously defined regulatory powers, who meddle in and complicate private
transactions in order to extract rents for themselves. A regulatory
authority with broadly defined powers may seek to extract rents for itself by
creating superfluous and apparently random loopholes and pitfalls which
affect private agents under circumstances which are difficult for the latter
to predict, and hence hard to avoid. Corruption "in the fabric" of a
regulatory system does not depend on the illicit sale of privileges, but
rather on the licit creation of ambiguous and unpredictable regulatory
structures, in order better to provoke disputes which the regulatory
authority itself will subsequently be called upon to intermediate and
resolve.
This paper examines the nexus between regulatory ambiguity and
corruption via a model in which a regulatory authority extracts a fee for
enforcing or voiding private agreements, in light of events which have
occurred after the agreement was formed, according to a system of rules which
can be either ambiguous or clear. In this context, the operation of clearer
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rules is more predictable ex ante by the contracting parties themselves,
while the operation of more ambiguous rules is less predictable.
The analysis in this paper is based on a contracting game in which two
private parties agree to a mutual exchange of services. Once a contract is
formed, one party immediately performs its contractual obligations, and the
second party promises to perform its reciprocal obligations at a specified
later time. Subsequently, when this performance comes due, the latter
decides either to perform as promised or to default completely. In the
remainder of the paper, I will refer to the party who performs first as the
creditor, and to the party who promises subsequent performance as the debtor.
This terminology is intended simply to denote the order of the parties'
expected performance under the contract. Intuitively, the debtor owes
performance of some kind to the creditor, though not necessarily the
repayment of a cash loan. For example, the model in this paper can be
applied to product licensing or manufacturing joint ventures, where one party
(the creditor) invests in production facilities and may also license
proprietary technology to another (the debtor), who agrees to produce
products conforming to the creditor's quality standards and promises not to
appropriate the creditor's technology.
To enforce a contract in default, the creditor must petition the
appropriate regulatory authority, hereafter the State, for redress. If the
creditor initiates a regulatory proceeding, then both the creditor and the
debtor face uncertainty about whether the State will hold the default to be
permissible or impermissible, and consequently to void or enforce the
contract. If the State enforces the contract, then the creditor receives his
full private value of contract performance (net of the initial outlay), and
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the debtor suffers a penalty. Otherwise, if the State refuses to enforce the
contract, then the creditor loses his prior performance, and the debtor
obtains a private default valuation. The creditor's private performance
valuation corresponds to the maximum amount of money that the creditor would
be willing to pay to enforce performance by the debtor. The debtor's private
default valuation depends on the circumstances in which default occurs, and
includes the value of appropriating the creditor's prior performance under
the contract. Regardless of outcome, the creditor pays the State a fixed fee
to adjudicate any default.
The State functions as a monopoly provider of binding arbitration, or
equivalently as the highest court of appeal, for contractual disputes between
private parties. Given the preceding model of private contracting, the
self-interested State seeks to design a profit-maximizing regulatory
structure by choosing jointly a degree of regulatory ambiguity and an
adjudication fee to maximize its own expected payoff from resolving
challenges to contracts in default. The State's optimal choice of regulatory
ambiguity and fee depends on the effect of both factors on the frequency of
contract formation, the frequency of default, and the likelihood that the
State will be called upon to resolve actual defaults.
Roughly speaking, the self-interested State will seek to create a
regulatory system which encourages the kind of disputes whose resolution can
command large fees from the disputants themselves. In designing such a
regulatory system, the State faces a fundamental tradeoff. Taking into
account equilibrium contracting behavior, higher levels of regulatory
ambiguity result in higher equilibrium default rates and hence more
opportunities for State intervention, but support lower adjudication fees.
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Contrariwise, in order to support higher adjudication fees, the State must
promulgate clearer regulations which result in lower equilibrium default
rates. In view of the equilibrium tradeoff between regulatory ambiguity and
sustainable adjudication fees, the State in effect must choose either to
regulate unambiguously at higher fees, or ambiguously at lower fees.
The State's choice of an optimal level of regulatory ambiguity raises a
fundamental question in the positive study of law and economics: Does a
self-interested regulatory authority prefer to administer unambiguous rules
directed at realizing efficient behavior among the regulated; or ambiguous
rules which introduce spurious noise into the delineation of permitted and
proscribed activities? To date, most theoretical research in the field of
law and economics has been normative, aiming to characterize efficient
legal rules or enforcement strategies. In contrast, the analysis in this
paper has a positive orientation. My goal is to determine whether it is in
the interest of a regulatory authority, possessing monopoly power over the
resolution of private disputes, to regulate efficiently.
In the context of my analysis, the idea of regulatory ambiguity relates
specifically to regulatory practice, as distinct from the "black letter"
content of statutory regulations. Statutory authority which is conditioned
An efficient regulatory system is one which codifies and enforces
norms of private behavior to maximize social welfare (Posner, 1986, Chapter
2). The normative approach to law and economics predicated on regulatory
efficiency is articulated in Becker (1968), Stigler (1970), and Posner
(1973). Later research has applied the efficiency standard to the design of
socially optimal rules and enforcement strategies in many different settings.
See, for example, Polinsky and Shavell (1979, 1992), Rubinfeld and Sappington
(1987), Kaplan and Shavell (1994), Mookherjee and Png (1994).
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on "reasonable" behavior, "foreseeable" hazards, or "substantial" damages
necessarily requires construction by the regulatory authority before one can
predict whether a given agreement or action will be permitted or voided under
specific circumstances. In this connection, broad regulatory authority
enables and facilitates, but does not force, ambiguous regulatory practice.
Nor does ambiguous regulatory practice necessarily require either a detailed
and complicated code of regulations, or expressly randomized decision-making
on the part of regulators. Deterministic regulatory enforcement which
expresses complex and highly differentiated rules of interpretation and
construction may be opaque and apparently random from the perspective of the
regulated. In practice, outcomes of specific cases may depend on detailed
factual circumstances which support a chain of reasoning whose conclusion is
2
difficult for nonspecialists (or outsiders) to predict.
Section II presents the model of private contracting in which eventual
defaults can be referred to the State for resolution. Equilibria for this
model, which depend on the State's chosen levels of regulatory ambiguity and
the adjudication fee, are characterized in Section III. Section IV analyzes
the State's profit-maximizing choice of regulatory ambiguity and fees in two
2
In practice, regulatory ambiguity is often associated with simple,
yet vague and potentially broad statutory authority. A particularly dark
example of this phenomenon, described in Solzhenitsyn (1973), was Article 58
of the former Soviet Criminal Code, "which summed up the world not so much
through the exact terms of its sections as in their extended dialectical
interpretation." Article 58 proved capable of such broad interpretation that
it was possible to interpret any private conversation as an attempt to begin
a subversive organization, and failure to report any conversation overheard
among others as collaboration.
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different situations, depending on whether the value of the contract in
default, represented as the creditor's private performance value, is either
unobservable or partially observable. I summarize my main results and offer
concluding comments in Section V.
II. Private Contracting with Enforcement by the State
This section describes a contracting game between private parties who
rely on the State to resolve eventual disputes. Successive stages of the
contracting game are presented below under separate headings, and shown in
extensive form in Figure 1. There follows a brief discussion of efficient
default in the context of the contracting model, and a reinterpretation of
the contracting model as a model of hierarchical review of regulatory
decisions.
A. Description of the Contracting Game
Contract Formation
The creditor initially decides whether to enter a contract with the
debtor. Both the creditor and debtor are risk neutral. If a contract is not
entered, the game ends with a payoff of 0 to both parties. If a contract is
entered, then the creditor immediately performs his contractual obligations,
incurring an outlay of s, and the game continues. The debtor's passive role
in contract formation will be justified by aspects of the model to be
described later, which guarantee that the debtor can obtain a payoff of at
least zero in any contingency which arises under the contract.
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Performance or Default
This stage is reached if a contract is formed. With probability S,
circumstances that arise after the contract is formed, but before performance
is due from the debtor, justify efficient default on the part of the debtor.
Default is efficient under conditions in which both contracting parties would
agree a priori to void the contract: for example, in contingencies where
performance would be excessively expensive for the debtor. I assume that
circumstances justifying efficient default are observable to the debtor and
verifiable by the State on review, but unobservable to the creditor.
When the debtor's performance is due, he must decide either to perform
as promised or to default completely. There are three possibilities. If
circumstances justifying efficient default have occurred, the debtor always
defaults. Such a default will be called efficient. If such circumstances
have not occurred, the debtor chooses either to honor the contract or to
default. A default which is not efficient will be called opportunistic.
If circumstances justifying efficient default have not occurred and the
debtor chooses to honor the contract, then the game ends with payoff
3
This idea of efficient breach of contract follows Ulen (1984).
4
Later, I will assume that the State always permits efficient
defaults; whence it is always optimal for the debtor to default in these
situations. Thus, a distinction arises between defaults which are
economically efficient, and defaults which are "efficient" in the narrow
sense that the debtor knows that the State will permit them. I address this
distinction in the discussion in Part B, and argue in Section IV that it is
likely to be innocuous in view of the State's optimal behavior.
~ 5
(v -s) > 0 to the creditor and 0 to debtor. The creditor's value of
c
contract performance v is known privately to himself. From the point of
c
view of both the debtor and the State, v obeys the distribution function
F(v) = y*(v <v), with density function f(v) = F'(v) and support on the
c
interval [v ,v ] .
-c cJ
If the debtor defaults, either efficiently or opportunistically, then
the game continues.
Acquiescence or Challenge
This point is reached if the debtor defaults on the contract. The
creditor knows that the debtor has defaulted, but does not know if the
default was efficient or opportunistic. The creditor must decide whether to
bring a regulatory action in order to attempt to enforce the contract.
If the creditor acquiesces to the default (does not challenge), then the
game ends. In the case of default with acquiescence, the creditor's payoff
is -s, the lost value of his prior performance. The debtor's payoff is 0 if
the default was actually efficient, and v > 0 if it was opportunistic.
The debtor's zero payoff from honoring the contract provides a
benchmark for comparing payoffs from other actions. The course of play is
not affected if the debtor's payoff from honoring the contract is positive.
Most importantly for my analysis, the creditor's performance value
v will be the maximum amount that the creditor would pay to enforce the
contract in the event of default. The performance value thus defined differs
from the "objective" market value of the contracted services because it also
reflects the value to the creditor of future plans whose realization is
contingent on contract performance.
- 9 -
If the creditor undertakes a regulatory challenge to the debtor's
default, then the State will decide to enforce or void the contract. The
State's determination of permissible defaults, and hence its decision whether
to enforce or void the original contract, is based on a deterministic system
of rules which takes into account circumstances which have arisen after the
contract was concluded but before performance was due from the debtor. It is
assumed that all efficient defaults are permissible, and that both the
creditor and debtor know this.
In addition to efficient defaults, the State may also permit
opportunistic defaults under any circumstances it chooses. The State
evaluates the circumstances attending an opportunistic default according to a
set of rules whose operation is equally predictable to both creditor and
debtor. From the point of view of both contracting parties, given that
circumstances justifying efficient default have not occurred, the State
enforces the contract against opportunistic default with probability e, and
permits an opportunistic default with probability (1-e). Hereafter, e will
be called regulatory clarity (similarly, (1-e) is regulatory ambiguity).
A defaulting debtor does possess an informational advantage over
the creditor, but only to the extent that the former knows if the default is
efficient. In a similar framework, Bebchuk (1984) considers the likelihood
of a negotiated settlement between the parties, a possibility which I do not
allow. Mao (1995) studies private contracting in the presence of regulatory
favoritism: that is, regulatory enforcement which is overtly biased in favor
of one party or the other. In contrast, regulatory ambiguity is neutral in
the sense that it directly favors neither party. The connection between
regulatory ambiguity and informational asymmetry will be discussed further in
Section IV.
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Perfect regulatory clarity (e = 100%) means that the State permits only
efficient defaults.
Without regard to the final judgement, the creditor pays an adjudication
fee k to the State for undertaking any regulatory challenge. If the State
decides to uphold the original contract, then the creditor's payoff is
v -s-i, the net private value of contract performance minus the adjudication
Q
fee; and the payoff to the debtor is -k < 0, a penalty. If the State
decides to permit the debtor's default, then the contract is simply voided.
In this event, the creditor's payoff is -(s+i), a loss equal to unrecompensed
prior performance plus the adjudication fee. The debtor's payoff is 0 if
the default was efficient, and v if it was opportunistic.
B. Discussion
Setting the debtor's payoff to zero in circumstances of efficient
default is an inessential normalization. Strictly speaking, any default is
"efficient" which is known to be permitted by the State under circumstances
privately observable to the debtor. Consequently, changing the debtor's
payoff in situations of efficient default would not affect the course of
play, provided that it remains greater than the payoff from honoring the
contract. In Section IV, I argue that the State optimally restricts the
scope of "efficient" defaults in the above sense to circumstances where
default is efficient in the usual sense that the creditor and debtor would
A penalty exacted from the debtor does not increase the payoff to
anyone else. This applies to penal servitude, or to the loss of reputation
following an adverse public judgement which limits the ability of an
opportunistically defaulting debtor to enter future contracts.
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agree a priori to void the original contract. Thus, the State does have a
legitimate role to play in settling contract disputes among private parties:
it can verify objectively whether circumstances justifying the debtor's
efficient default, but unobservable to the creditor, have actually occurred.
It is possible to reinterprete the contracting model to apply also in
situations where the regulatory decisions of a lower-level authority are
subject to appeal and review at a higher level. In this reinterpretation,
the "debtor" becomes the regulatory authority who initially applies a set of
rules to a particular claimant, the "creditor". If dissatisfied with the
lower-level decision, the claimant may appeal it for review to a superior
authority, who assumes the role of the "State". Thus, the contracting model
may be used to represent the interaction between trial courts and appeal
courts, or between lower and upper levels in the decision-making hierarchy of
any regulatory agency: for example, public agencies charged with interpreting
tax codes, customs duties, and product quality standards.
III. Equilibrium Contracting, Default, and Challenge
This section describes equilibria in the contracting game for given
values of the adjudication fee Z and regulatory clarity e. To avoid
trivialities, I assume that £ and e are both strictly positive. This means
that from the creditor's point of view, regulatory challenge in the event of
the debtor's default is neither free nor pointless.
A. Types of Equilibria
As is clear from Figure 1, the sequence of play which occurs after a
contract is entered constitutes a subgame of the overall contracting game.
This follows from two key aspects of the game's information structure. A
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defaulting debtor knows whether his default is efficient or opportunistic,
but does not know if the creditor will subsequently challenge the default.
Likewise, a creditor decides to acquiesce or challenge a default without
knowing if it is efficient or opportunistic.
For given values of the adjudication fee Z and regulatory clarity e, the
creditor enters the contract only if his expected payoff in the resulting
equilibrium of the post-contract subgame is nonnegative. Supposing that a
contract has been formed, I denote by fi the conditional probability that the
debtor will default opportunistically, given that circumstances justifying
efficient default do not arise. Similarly, a denotes the conditional
probability that the creditor will undertake a regulatory challenge, given
that the debtor defaults. An equilibrium in the post-contract subgame is a
* *
strategy pair (a ,/? ) for the creditor's rate of challenge and the debtor's
rate of default which maximizes the expected payoff to each side in view of
the other's behavior. A contracting equilibrium of the overall game is an
equilibrium (a ,/? ) of the post-contract subgame in which the creditor's
expected payoff is nonnegative.
* *
Any contracting equilibrium must have a > 0 and ft > 0. Otherwise,
* *
a — 0 provokes 0 = 1, whereby the debtor appropriates the creditor's prior
performance with certainty. Likewise, ft = 0 implies a = 0 in view of £>0,
which then leads to the same contradiction. Consequently, any contracting
equilibrium exhibits strictly positive frequencies of opportunistic default
*
and challenge. If /? = 1 , contract formation plus acquiescence results in
certain appropriation of the creditor's prior performance. Consequently,
* *
(3 = 1 implies a = 1 in any contracting equilibrium.
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Given that circumstances justifying efficient default have not occurred,
the debtor's expected payoff from defaulting opportunistically is
(1 - ae)v - aek. (1)
*
In equilibrium, if (1) is strictly positive with a = a , then the debtor
always defaults opportunistically, and hence /? = 1 . The debtor is
indifferent between honoring the contract and defaulting opportunistically,
and thus chooses /?e(0,l], if
v
a = D- . (2)
e(vD + k)
The creditor's decision whether to acquiesce or challenge in the event
of default depends on his private value of contract performance. For a
creditor whose contract performance value is v , acquiescence in the event of
default yields the expected payoff
(l-5)(l-/3)v - s , (3)
while challenging a default yields the expected payoff
(1-S)[(1-/?) + /?e]vc - [5 + (l-6)fi]2 - s . (4)
The derivative of (4) with respect to v is strictly greater than the
same derivative of (3). This monotonicity, or single-crossing, property
assures that if regulatory challenge is optimal for a given creditor
valuation, then it is also optimal for all higher creditor valuations.
Similarly, if acquiescence to default is optimal for a given creditor
valuation, then it is also optimal for all lower creditor valuations. In an
equilibrium with a < 1, an interval of high-valuation creditors contracts
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and challenges in the event of default, and an adjacent interval of creditors
with lower performance valuations contracts and acquiesces in the event of
default. Finally, there may remain an interval of creditors whose
performance valuations are so low that they choose not to contract.
I next define several contract performance values which are useful in
ACO
characterizing contracting equilibria: v is the contract performance
value of a creditor who obtains zero payoff from entering a contract and
acquiescing in the event of default; v is the contract performance value
of a creditor who obtains zero payoff from entering a contract and
TNn
challenging in the event of default; and v is the contract performance
value of a creditor who is indifferent between acquiescence and challenge,











A contracting equilibrium exists whenever regulatory clarity e is
sufficiently high relative to the adjudication fee i. Subject to this
observation, a contracting equilibrium corresponding to a given fee/clarity
pair (i,e) is unique, and its character depends on the level of regulatory





If regulatory clarity e is strictly greater than e , then f3 = 1 with
a = 1 would yield strictly negative expected payoff to the debtor. Thus, in
a contracting equilibrium with e > e, the debtor strictly randomizes between
*
contract observance and opportunistic default according to 0 < /? < 1. To
support this indifference, the equilibrium probability a of regulatory
challenge by the creditor must be
a* = e/e < 1 . (5)
*
The equilibrium probability j3 of opportunistic default by the debtor is






using the value of a from (5). In a contracting equilibrium with e > e,
opportunistic default and regulatory challenge are both strictly randomized:
0 < a < 1 and 0 < ft < 1. The structure of a randomizing contracting
equilibrium is shown in Figure 2a.
If regulatory clarity e is strictly less than e, then the debtor's
expected profit from opportunistic default is positive even if the creditor
challenges with certainty. Thus, a contracting equilibrium with e < e is
degenerate in the sense that both opportunistic default and challenge occur
* *
with certainty (a = 1 and ft = 1) . Figure 2b shows the canonical structure
of a degenerate contracting equilibrium.
- 16 -
In the special case that regulatory clarity € exactly equals e,
g
existence of contracting equilibrium also implies nonuniqueness. However,
this possibility is unimportant in the following analysis, and will be
ignored.
The possibilities for randomizing and degenerate contracting equilibria
are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For given levels of the adjudication fee Jt and regulatory
clarity e, suppose that a contracting equilibrium exists.
(i) If e > e, then the contracting equilibrium is unique and strictly
* *
randomizing: 0 < a < 1 and 0 < ft < 1. Equilibrium rates of
opportunistic default and challenge are determined by (5) and (6).
(ii) If e < e, then the contracting equilibrium is unique and degenerate:
a* = 1 and $ = 1.
For given values of the adjudication fee i and regulatory clarity e, let
* *
f be the equilibrium rate of contract formation. Obviously, f = 0 in a
noncontracting equilibrium. In a contracting equilibrium, the rate of
A contracting equilibrium with e = e must have a = 1 ; otherwise, a
challenge rate strictly less than one would induce opportunistic default with
certainty. For Z sufficiently low, there exist multiple randomizing
* * *
contracting equilibria with a = 1 and 0 < fi < 1. /3 may assume any value
v . I T -, . .
 n i - i ACQ IND , CHL, , , - . -, . . .
between the lower limit 0 at which v = v [ = v ] (this is a limiting
case of the equilibrium structure in Figure 2b), and the upper limit ft, which
is the lesser of one and the value of fi at which v = v (this is a limiting
case of the equilibrium structure in Figure 2a). If /? = 1, then the set of
contracting equilibria includes a degenerate equilibrium in which default and
challenge both occur with certainty.
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contract formation depends on whether challenge is certain or uncertain in
the event of default. On the basis of the preceding discussion, a
contracting equilibrium (a ,fi ) exhibits
1 - F(vACQ|Q=a* *) if a < 1
1 - F(vCHL * . *) if a = 1 .
a=a , P~P
(7)
5. The Insignificance of Degenerate Contracting Equilibria
For e > e, a randomizing contracting equilibrium always exists if the
adjudication fee £ is sufficiently low. However, for e < e, the only
possible type of contracting equilibrium is degenerate, and such an
equilibrium may fail to exist for any positive value of St.
In a degenerate contracting equilibrium, a creditor with performance
valuation v who enters the contract receives the expected payoff
(l-S)v e - s - it. This expected payoff must (at least) be positive for the
creditor with the highest performance valuation v. Therefore, setting i to
zero, a necessary (and sufficient) condition for existence of degenerate
contracting equilibria is
s
c > . (8)
(l-S)v
From (8), degenerate contracting equilibria will fail to exist if
threshold regulatory clarity e is small in comparison to the creditor's
initial outlay as a percentage of the maximal performance valuation net of
the likelihood of efficient default. Condition (8) is difficult to satisfy,
which indicates that degenerate contracting equilibria are unlikely to occur
in practice.
- 18 -
To demonstrate this point, I consider an extreme example. First,
normalize the creditor's initial outlay to s = 1, so that the creditor's
performance value can be interpreted as an expected internal rate of return
under the contract. With a maximal creditor valuation as high as v = 2.00
(representing a 100% rate of return on the initial outlay) and efficient
default rate 5 = 1 % , existence of a degenerate contracting equilibrium
requires e > .505. A degenerate contracting equilibrium fails to exist if
the penalty rate k is at least as large as the debtor's default value v ,
which implies e < .5.
IV. Optimal Regulatory Ambiguity
How should the State choose its adjudication fee i and regulatory
clarity e in order to maximize its own expected payoff? For the purposes of
the present analysis, the State's expected payoff is taken to be simply the
expected value of its revenues obtained from the adjudication of disputes
between the creditor and the debtor. Such revenues arise only if the
contract is formed, the debtor defaults, and the creditor challenges the
default. Thus, the State's expected payoff is
* *a*i , (9)
* * *
where r , 0 , and a indicate equilibrium values for the rates of contract
formation, opportunistic default, and regulatory challenge resulting from
the fee/clarity pair (i,e).
From the discussion in Section III, degenerate contracting equilibria
fail to exist unless the penalty rate k is low relative to the debtor's
default value v , and the maximum creditor performance value v is large
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relative to the initial outlay s. Hereafter, I assume that degenerate
contracting equilibria do not exist. Accordingly, the State maximizes its
expected revenue by choosing among levels of regulatory clarity e above the
minimum threshold e, which results in randomizing contracting equilibria.
In the following, it is convenient to define <f> = 8 + (1-8)ft as the
aggregate rate of default in the (randomizing) equilibrium (a ,fi ) which
results from (i,e). Applying equilibrium condition (6) to (9), the State's
expected profit in a randomizing equilibrium can be represented as
(10)
A. Unobservable Creditor Valuations
The contracting model of Section II assumes that both the debtor and the
State perceive the creditor's value of contract performance as a random
variable v distributed according to F(•) on the interval [v,v]. Since
neither the debtor nor the State has more precise information about the
valuation of contract performance to specific creditors, such as might be
A penalty rate k that is low relative to the debtor's default value
v produces a low threshold efficiency level e. Assuming that the efficient
default rate 8 is small, I ignore its influence in the present discussion.
My calculations of parametric examples show that even in situations
where degenerate contracting equilibria are possible, the State obtains
higher expected revenue over choices of regulatory efficiency and fees which
yield randomizing contracting equilibria. However, I am not able to prove
that randomizing equilibria (e > e) yield higher expected revenue to the
State than degenerate equilibria (e < e) in all situations.
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gleaned from their observable characteristics, the basic model depicts a
situation in which individual creditor valuations are unobservable.
For a given level of regulatory clarity e G (e,100%], define i(e) to be
the adjudication fee which maximizes the State's expected revenue in a
contracting equilibrium. Similarly, for a given adjudication fee Z, e(i)
indicates the State's revenue-maximizing level of regulatory clarity. The
adjudication fee £ is feasible if e(i) is well-defined: that is, if i can
support a contracting equilibrium with some level of regulatory clarity
12
e G (c.100%]. The following proposition is proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 2. For any feasible adjudication fee $.:
(i) || (i,e(i)) < 0.
(ii) If e(i) < 100%, then n(£,e(£)) is strictly increasing in i.
According to Proposition 2(i), for any feasible adjudication fee, the
State's clarity-optimized expected revenue is negatively related to the rate
of "efficient" default 8. It follows that the self-interested State will
interprete circumstances justifying "efficient" default as narrowly as
possible, thus minimizing S. The intuition behind this result is simple.
Since "efficient" defaults are known to be permissible and occur under
circumstances privately observable to the debtor, enlarging their scope
12
An adjudication fee i is feasible if it is not too high. Formally,
2 is feasible if it yields a contracting equilibrium when accompanied by
perfect regulatory clarity, e = 100%.
13
As before in Section II, I use quotation marks to distinguish
defaults which are "efficient" in the formal sense of the contracting model
from those which are economically efficient.
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increases the debtor's informational advantage. This makes the creditor less
likely to challenge a default, which hurts the State's revenues.
Consequently, the State optimally restricts the scope of permitted defaults
under circumstances privately observable to the debtor to contingencies in
which the debtor's default is genuinely efficient in the sense that, if
default were not permitted, the contracting parties would not voluntarily
enter the contract.
Ironically, in view of the preceding discussion, some positive
probability of efficient default is essential to State's role in dispute
resolution. If 6 = 0, then a degenerate contracting equilibrium is possible
in which the debtor never defaults, and the creditor credibly promises that
he would challenge any default, regardless of the adjudication fee.
Alternatively, if the penalty k represents a loss to the debtor due to
exclusion from future contracting opportunities, then the creditor could
simply announce that any observed default, necessarily opportunistic, will be
punished. In either case, the State's role becomes superfluous.
In effect, Proposition 2(i) implies that the State does not profit from
regulatory uncertainty which confers an informational advantage on the
debtor. Consequently, the State's interest in maximizing its payoff from
dispute resolution naturally reduces to choosing an optimal degree of
regulatory ambiguity: that is, regulatory uncertainty which constitutes pure
noise from the perspective of the affected parties.
Proposition 2(ii) shows that the State's expected payoff 7r(i,e(i)) is
strictly increasing along the clarity-optimized path (i,e(i)) for
e(Jl) < 100%. Consequently, choosing its adjudication fee jointly with
regulatory clarity, the State maximizes expected revenue with perfect
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regulatory clarity, e = 100%. Thus, with unobservable performance values,
the revenue-maximizing State does choose to regulate unambiguously; but also
sets a high adjudication fee. The high fee induces low-value creditors to
acquiesce in the event of default, which leads debtors to default
opportunistically in spite of the absence of regulatory loopholes.
In order to elucidate further the relation between the level of the
adjudication fee 2, and the State's expected payoff 7r(i, e (i)) , I examine in
detail a pair of parametric examples. Both examples are similar except that
performance valuations to creditors are uniformly higher in the second
example than in the first. In Example I, v is uniformly distributed on
[1.10,1.20]; in Example II, v is uniformly distributed on [1.15,1.25]. In
both examples, 6 = 3%, s = 1, and k = 3v . Thus, e = 25%, whence only
randomizing contracting equilibria are possible in each example via (8).
In the following discussion, £. indicates the limit for £(e) as e
14
decreases to e. With this definition, (i,i(100%)] is the range of
adjudication fees for which the associated optimal levels of regulatory
clarity vary without constraint between the limiting values e and 100%.
In both examples, for different feasible values of the adjudication fee
i, Table 1 shows the associated optimal levels of regulatory clarity e(i) and
payoffs to the State ir(Jl ,e(Jt)) , together with equilibrium values of the rate
of contract formation T , the debtor's aggregate default rate <f> , and the
* 15
creditor's rate of regulatory challenge a . The relation between the
14
Similarly, i can be defined to be the maximum feasible adjudication
fee (see note 6). Since 7r(i,100%) = 0, it will be true that i(100%) < i.
Numerical contracting equilibria in this paper were calculated
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adjudication fee i and the State's clarity-optimized payoff 7r(i,e(i)) is
graphically represented in Figure 3a. The equilibrium default rate <f> along
the clarity-optimized path (Jt,e(Jt)) is nearly invariant in both examples for
I e (i,i(100%)]: $ « 7.3% for v ~ U[l.10,1.20], and 0* « 10.3% for
v ~ U[l.15,1.25]. In Example I, the State earns maximized expected revenue
* 16
1.83% with the adjudication fee Z = 83%; in Example II, the revenue maximum
of 3.08% is realized with the adjudication fee S. = 94%. These adjudication
fees correspond to the respective values of i(100%) in each example.
*
The relative invariance of the aggregate default rate <f> (and hence the
*
opportunistic default rate /3 ) on the clarity-optimized path (i,e(i)) for
j!e(i, i(100%)] helps to explain why the State increases its expected payoff
with greater regulatory clarity and higher adjudication fees. With <f>
ACQ
constant, the threshold contract value for acquiescence v , and hence the
*
equilibrium rate of contract formation f are also constant. Subject to this
constraint, (10) implies that the State's expected payoff will increase along
the path (i,e(i)) if and only if the optimal adjudication fee increases more
than proportionately with increased regulatory clarity. Comparing the
ACQ
equilibrium condition (6), it is seen that with v constant, the threshold
performance valuation v , which indicates indifference between acquiescence
and challenge in the event of default, must increase as regulatory clarity e
increases. An increase in the equilibrium value of v implies that the
using software written in the Mathematics 2.2 programming language. This
software is available from the author on request.
1 fi
In the following, the State's adjudication fees and expected
payoffs are expressed as percentages of the creditor's initial outlay, s = 1.
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adjudication fee rises more than proportionately with the level of regulatory
clarity, whence the State's expected payoff also rises.
Relaxing the constraint that the default rate <f> be strictly constant
along the clarity-optimized path (J>,e(Jt)) for Jte(Jt, i(100%)] does not alter
the conclusion that the State's expected payoff increases as the adjudication
fee increases. For Example I (with low creditor performance values), Table 1
shows that Jt increases more than proportionately with e(Jt), though by less
than the amount that would be implied by strict constancy of the equilibrium
default rate. Consequently, the induced equilibrium default rate falls
slightly (and hence the equilibrium contract probability f slightly rises)
as regulatory clarity increases. In Example II (with high creditor
performance values) , the optimal contract frequency ¥ equals one along the
clarity-optimized path (Jt,e(J>)) for Jt £ (i,i(100%) ] . Since the value of ?*
* ACQ *
is determined by <j> (via v ) , <f> is therefore completely invariant across
different fee levels along the clarity-optimized path in Example II.
While both examples confirm that the State's expected payoff n(Jt, e(Jt))
increases with the adjudication fee Jt, it is also apparent that the magnitude
of this increase is small. In percentage terms, the State's expected payoff
is also approximately invariant along the clarity-optimized path (Jt,e(Jt)) for
Jt e (£,Jt(100%)] .
This quantitative result is not coincidental. If the distribution of
creditor valuations were concentrated at a single point,then the State's
expected payoff would be exactly identical at every (randomizing) contracting
equilibrium along the clarity-optimized path. In this situation, the State
is completely indifferent to the level of its adjudication fee, provided that
regulatory clarity can be adjusted to compensate. In Examples I and II, the
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approximate invariance of the State's expected payoff along the clarity-
optimized path demonstrates a substantial degree of convergence to this
limiting case.
The following proposition treats the limiting case of an degenerate
distribution of creditor performance values. It is proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 3. Suppose that all potential creditors have the same contract
valuation v > s. For adjudication fees Z G (i,i(100%)],
(i) Optimal regulatory clarity e(£) increases exactly in proportion with Z.
(ii) In clarity-optimized contracting equilibria resulting from (£,e(i)),
the aggregate default rate and payoff to the State are constant:
<t>* = (v -s)/s and n(t,e(£)) = e[(l-5)v - s].
L ""•
B. Partially Observable Creditor Valuations
Suppose that a certain characteristic z, commonly observable to the
creditor, debtor, and State, contains information about the creditor's
private performance valuation v . The equilibrium behavior of the creditor
and debtor will be sensitive to this characteristic as follows. If the
realization of z signals a low performance value for the creditor, both
parties anticipate a lower rate of challenge in the event of default; hence
the equilibrium rate of opportunistic default increases and the rate of
contract formation declines. Conversely, if the realization of z signals a
high performance value for the creditor, both parties anticipate a higher
rate of challenge in the event of default; whence the equilibrium rate of
opportunistic default falls and the rate of contract formation increases. In
view of these reactions, the State optimally conditions its adjudication fee
and regulatory clarity on the observed value of z.
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According to the foregoing analysis, the State would ideally prefer to
offer perfect regulatory clarity e(z) = 100% in all contingencies for z,
while adjusting the adjudication fee i(z) according to the conditional
distribution of v given z. A higher conditional distribution for the
creditor valuation v |z would provoke a higher adjudication fee £(z). This
fee structure implies that in two contract disputes with the same factual
circumstances but different stakes in interest v |z, the State would resolve
both disputes identically while assessing different fees. In practice, the
State may be unable to implement such a pricing strategy, which could be
perceived to violate an elementary principle of fairness that enforcement of
identical substantive regulations (implied by constancy of e) should not be
subject to fee discrimination based on the value of the disputed claim.
Reflecting this concern for fairness, I consider the situation in which
the State maximizes its expected payoff with a uniform adjudication fee i,
while adjusting the level of regulatory clarity e(z) contingent on z. In
effect, this means that the State is free to apply different standards of
precision or slackness in regulatory enforcement according to the anticipated
value of the stake in interest v |z, but is precluded from practicing direct
fee discrimination.
With partial information about the creditor's performance valuation, the
general outline of the State's revenue-maximizing strategy is clear. I
assume that increasing realizations of z are associated with increased
distributions of creditor values v |z. If the level of regulatory clarity as
well as the adjudication fee were chosen to be uniform, then higher values of
z would be associated with lower rates of opportunistic breach, since the
adjudication fee would be comparatively low in these contingencies. To
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offset this effect, the State optimally reduces the level of regulatory-
clarity at higher realizations for z, effectively encouraging higher rates of
opportunistic breach by increasing the frequency of regulatory loopholes.
As an example, I assume that the observable characteristic z signals
that the creditor belongs either to the low-valuation population of Example I
or the high-valuation population of Example II. This means that
v |z=l ~ U[1.10,1.20] and v | z=2 ~ U[l. 15 ,1. 25] . To complete the example, I
c c
assume that both classes of creditor performance valuations are equally
likely, whence ^(z=l) = 7>(z=2) = 50%.
If the State sets a uniform adjudication fee, then it optimally chooses
£** = 83.2% together with e**(l) = 100% and e**(2) = 88.4%, and obtains an
expected payoff of 2.45%. Comparing Table 1, notice that optimal uniform
adjudication fee i with clarity discrimination is only slightly larger than
the optimal fee for the homogeneous population of low-valuation creditors,
but that optimal regulatory clarity to high-value creditors e (2) is
significantly reduced from 100%. This results from the relative invariance
of the State's payoff to its adjudication fee along the clarity-optimized
path for the high-value subgroup of creditors (See Figure 3b).
Strikingly, the State's expected payoff with a uniform adjudication fee
and clarity discrimination is virtually identical to its first-best payoff
with flexible fees and perfect clarity for both creditor classes. Under the
first-best approach with fee discrimination, the State's expected payoff is
.5(1.83%) + .5(3.08%) = 2.45% (the difference in expected payoffs appears
first in the thousandth's place). The examples show that when the States
expected payoff is relatively invariant along the clarity-optimized paths of
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different creditor classes, clarity discrimination substitutes almost
perfectly for fee discrimination.
In contrast, if the State chooses a uniform adjudication fee while
maintaining perfect regulatory clarity in both contingencies for z, then the
resulting optimal fee i*** - 92.3% together with e***(l) = e***(2) = 100%
yields an expected payoff of only 2.10%. This is a proportional reduction of
14.3% in comparison with the State's expected payoff with a uniform fee and
clarity discrimination. The drop in the State's expected payoff results from
the reduced rate of contracting in the subgroup of low-value creditors. With
*** ***
i =92.3% and e (1) = 100%, the equilibrium rate of contracting among
**
low-valuation creditors is only 45%; as opposed to 87% with S, =83.2% and
e (1) = 100% under clarity discrimination. Thus, when creditor performance
valuations are partially observable, the State's ability to apply regulatory
loopholes specifically in situations of high expected performance valuations
can result in both a lower uniform adjudication fee and a higher rate of
contract formation than would occur with fee uniformity and perfect
regulatory clarity.
V. Concluding Comments
If a regulatory authority can vary its adjudication fee according to
observable characteristics signalling a claimant's willingness to pay, then
it optimally provides uniformly unambiguous regulatory enforcement at high
and variable fees. This conclusion supports, albeit rather cynically, the
proposition that a self-interested regulatory authority seeks to regulate
efficiently, in the sense that it enforces clear and predictable delineations
between permitted and prohibited defaults on private contracts, while
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limiting permitted defaults to those which are efficient. However, the
optimality of efficient regulation depends on the regulatory authority's
ability to charge different fees to claimants according to the expected
values of their stakes in interest, even if the cases they present are
substantively identical.
The situation is different if the regulatory authority cannot directly
discriminate with respect to fees, either in consideration of fairness or
because its fees are set exogenously. If the regulatory authority must
charge a uniform fee to all claimants, then it optimally discriminates with
respect to the ambiguity of regulatory enforcement according to circumstances
which are related to the value of the stake at issue. The ability to
discriminate with respect to regulatory interpretation and enforcement, and
hence with respect to regulatory ambiguity in practice, substitutes for overt
fee discrimination. The examples show that the degree of ambiguity in
regulatory enforcement is likely to be higher when the stake at interest is
more valuable. Thus, a regulatory authority with uniform fees is more likely
to pronounce simple (clear) summary judgements in low-value disputes, while
reserving more detailed (ambiguous) scrutiny for high-value disputes. Stated
bluntly, a self-interested regulatory authority applies regulatory loopholes
more frequently when more money is at stake.
Finally, the regulatory authority's payoff from ambiguity discrimination
can be relatively invariant over a broad range of fee levels, and may closely
approximate the first-best payoff from fee discrimination. Under these
conditions, the regulatory authority is almost indifferent to the level of
its fees, provided that it remains free to adjust its enforcement standards
accordingly. In this situation, legislative attempts to set low regulatory
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fees may simply lead to more erratic enforcement, with little net effect on
the frequency of disputes or the income of the regulatory authority.
A regulatory authority's relative indifference between different degrees
of ambiguity in enforcement, with appropriately adjusted fees, has troubling
practical implications. Absent a strong preference for regulatory clarity,
the choice of regulatory regime may be driven in practice by considerations
outside the scope of the formal model in this paper. In this spirit, there
is a potential bias favoring regulatory ambiguity, which serves to conceal
overt bribery and corruption of the traditional sort. A regulatory regime in
which ambiguous rules are subject to broad interpretation lends itself to the
pursuit of special arrangements and dispensations based on connections and
interest; a more transparent system in which rules and their consequences are
predictable does not. In a climate of regulatory ambiguity, outcomes which
are actually based on favoritism or bribery can be passed off as the result
of objective evaluation of particular circumstances in individual cases.
In this way, corruption "in the fabric" of a regulatory system is
complementary with the practice of overt trading in private interests by the
people charged with its enforcement. In formerly communist countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, people have become accustomed to believe that the
formal structure of regulatory codes or institutions makes little difference
to their function: Formal structures are always manipulable; what really
matters are the interests of the people in control. In such an environment,
a delicate preference for regulatory clarity, based on the ability to
practice fee discrimination, will offer little resistance to the temptation
for individual self-enrichment through bribery and influence peddling, which
thrive better in the indulgent half-light of regulatory ambiguity.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. The State's expected payoff in the randomizing
contracting equilibrium which results from adjudication fee i and regulatory
clarity e > e is n(£,e) = ef <f> [£/e] . In the following, threshold creditor
valuations v and v refer to the contracting equilibrium (a ,/3 ) which
results from (i,e); while ?* = 1 - F(vACQ) and <j>* = 8 + (1-8)13* are the
probabilities of contract formation and default in the same equilibrium.
For a given adjudication fee Z, let e(i) G (e,100%] be the degree of
regulatory clarity which maximizes the State's expected payoff. We have
*
d Inn d Inn d ln<f>
(i,e(i)) - + 1 ; (Al)
dln<f>
while the o p t i m a l i t y of e ( i ) implies t h a t
d lnnr d Inn d ln<f>
(A2)
> 0 ,
with strict equality to zero in (A2) whenever e(Z) < 100%
Differentiating the equilibrium condition (6) yields
_, INDN INDf(v )v
c/ IND. IND f * - N - l , Cf ACQ. ACQ
f(v )v S((f> -8) + f(v )v a
> 0 (A3)
and
I ND IND * *
f(v )v + a f
Sine f(v )v 8(<j> -8) + f(v )v a <f> (l-<f> )
< 0 . (A4)
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Comparison of (A2) and (A4) establishes that (i,e(i)) < 0. Notice
that this conclusion applies even if e(£) = 100%.
Applying once more to the equilibrium condition (6), it is easy to show
that -jjj > 0. This simply says that increasing the probability of efficient




Next, observe from (A3) and (A4) that
* *8In<f> 8ln<j> a f
dine DENOM
where DENOM is the common denominator of the partial derivatives in (A3) and
(A4).
By the envelope theorem, n' (Jt,e(&)) = n (i,e(i)) , where the subscript
indicates partial differentiation. Whenever e(S.) < 100%, adding (Al) and
(A2) gives
8 In7r 8 ln?r
t Sine
which proves (ii). Q.E.D.
Remarks: Using the same method of proof as above, it is also possible to
show that the State's expected payoff is increasing in regulatory clarity e
along the fee-optimized path (i(e),e). Formally, one obtains the counterpart
to Proposition 2(ii): 7r'(i(e),e) > 0 for all e e (e,100%]. Because the
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State's choice of an optimal regulatory fee i(e) is unbounded from above, the
counterpart proposition for the fee-optimized path applies even if e = 100%.
It is clear that the global maximum for the State's expected payoff occurs
along the fee-optimized path with e = 100% and S. = i(100%). Comparing
Proposition 2(ii) with its counterpart, the optimal regulatory fee i(100%)
must exceed Z on the clarity-optimized path (i,e(i)) for which e(i) = 100%.
However, for both examples in the text, the difference between i(100%) and £
is negligible.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that the distribution of creditor valuations
F(•) is degenerate at v > s. Consider a randomizing contracting equilibrium
resulting from the adjudication fee i with regulatory clarity e. Equilibrium
condition (5) is unaffected; while (6) becomes simply v = v , from which
Sv
V -
If i is fixed and e variable, then the State maximizes its expected
payoff by choosing e(i) such that the representative creditor enters the
contract and earns (almost) zero expected profit. For i e (i,i(100%)], the
clarity-optimized contracting equilibrium with (i,e(i)) is thus characterized
*
by full participation, f = 1 , and zero expected payoff to the creditor,
(W*)v - s = 0.
Combining the equilibrium and zero-profit conditions yields




from which e(i) increases proportionately with i, and <j> = (v -s)/s
Finally, w(i,c(i)) = &*$ [Jl/eW] = e[(l-5)v - s]. Q.E.D.
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Table 1. Contracting Equilibria with Varying Adjudication Fees
A. Low Range of Performance Valuations: v ~ U[1.10,1.20]
c
Adjudication Fee






25.3% 37.2% 49.1% 60.9% 72.8% 84.6% 96.5% 100%
1.73% 1.78% 1.80% 1.81% 1.82% 1.83% 1.83% 1.62%
85.6% 86.3% 86.7% 86.9% 87.0% 87.1% 87.2% 57.7%
10.3% 10.2% 10.2% 10.2% 10.2% 10.1% 10.1% 12.5%
98.7% 67.2% 51.0% 41.1% 34.3% 29.5% 25.9% 25.0%
B. High Range of Performance Valuations: v ~ U[l.15,1.25]
Adjudication Fee






25.0% 33.2% 43.6% 53.9% 64.3% 74.7% 85.1% 95.5%
2.11% 2.95% 2.99% 3.02% 3.04% 3.05% 3.06% 3.07%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
10.5% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0%
100% 75.4% 57.4% 46.3% 38.9% 33.5% 29.4% 26.2%
Notes: Adjudication fees and payoffs are percentages of the creditor's
initial outlay s. In both examples: s = 1.00, 5 = 3 % , and k = 3v ;
thus e - 25%.








































Figure 2. Types of Contracting Equilibria
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Figure 3. The Fee / Clarity Tradeoff
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